By dropping drug charges against Mexico's former defense minister, the AG also hoped to prevent the exposure of CIA sources in the military, agents say
I recall when DEA was forced to operate in Mexico for many years without having any official diplomatic cover to carry weapons for self-defense. It was for the most part done successfully without a serious incident, and was mostly ‘arranged’ on a local level with a wink and a nod between DEA on the ground and whatever local police authority had control in that area. During this period the Mexican military, in particular the Army, was vehemently against DEA having weapons of any sort until sometime in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s when the relationship between them improved and the Army was brought into the drug fight kicking and screaming, fearful of their personnel getting corrupted. That fear was realized, however, long before they expressed concern about it occurring.
Elaine got it right. I suspect your scenario regarding the relationships between the CIA, Mex Army, and other Mexican intel services and the possibility of methods & techniques and sources being revealed - was the deciding factor for DOJ’s decision. To think, however, that Cienfuegos return to Mexico would somehow get handled there was more than naïve.
I get the importance of not jeopardizing our other agencies intelligence collection abilities there, but now we need to ensure DEA and other assigned U.S. LE agencies assigned there are not unreasonably limited in performing their duties. The proposed legislation to eliminate diplomatic immunity now being considered by the Mexican congress would in effect make any operational or intelligence collection operation challenging, if not impossible, and extremely risky to DEA personnel and assets, beyond what DEA currently encounters.
This story is worth tracking closely for developments as it has the potential to even more uglier..
Ames returned from his assignment to Mexico in 1983, before he volunteered his services to the Soviets.
I recall when DEA was forced to operate in Mexico for many years without having any official diplomatic cover to carry weapons for self-defense. It was for the most part done successfully without a serious incident, and was mostly ‘arranged’ on a local level with a wink and a nod between DEA on the ground and whatever local police authority had control in that area. During this period the Mexican military, in particular the Army, was vehemently against DEA having weapons of any sort until sometime in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s when the relationship between them improved and the Army was brought into the drug fight kicking and screaming, fearful of their personnel getting corrupted. That fear was realized, however, long before they expressed concern about it occurring.
Elaine got it right. I suspect your scenario regarding the relationships between the CIA, Mex Army, and other Mexican intel services and the possibility of methods & techniques and sources being revealed - was the deciding factor for DOJ’s decision. To think, however, that Cienfuegos return to Mexico would somehow get handled there was more than naïve.
I get the importance of not jeopardizing our other agencies intelligence collection abilities there, but now we need to ensure DEA and other assigned U.S. LE agencies assigned there are not unreasonably limited in performing their duties. The proposed legislation to eliminate diplomatic immunity now being considered by the Mexican congress would in effect make any operational or intelligence collection operation challenging, if not impossible, and extremely risky to DEA personnel and assets, beyond what DEA currently encounters.
This story is worth tracking closely for developments as it has the potential to even more uglier..