Dmitri Alperovitch on the New Cold War with China
In a jarring interview and new book, the geopolitical whiz fears Xi preparing to conquer Taiwan as his legacy
In December 2021, Dmitri Alperovitch famously predicted that Vladimir Putin would invade Ukraine—two months before he actually did. A veteran cybersecurity maven, and co-founder and former chief technology officer at CrowdStrike, the firm that uncovered the Russian hack of the Democratic National Committee, Alperovitch has now expanded his horizons, warning in a new book, World on the Brink, that China’s Xi Jinping is “likely” to invade Taiwan—and may do so as early as four years from now. It’s a war that he acknowledges could provoke a full scale military confrontation with the United States—a conflict that in some senses has already begun in what Alperovitch describes as a new Cold War. In an interview with SpyTalk, Alperovitch explained his reasoning as well as the nature of the China threat– including evidence of recent cyber espionage attacks by a Chinese military hacking group known as Volt Typhoon that may be more alarming than anybody realized. What follows is an edited transcript of the conversation.
Spytalk: So you start out the book with this nightmare scenario of a full blown Chinese invasion of Taiwan—gunships, guided missile destroyers, kamikaze drones as part of a meticulously coordinated attack on the island. Tell us why you think this is where things are headed?
Alperovitch: As you know, Michael, I was one of the first geopolitical analysts to have predicted that Putin was going to invade Ukraine months before it happened. And the reasons that I believe drove Putin to invade Ukraine—that convinced me back then that this war was almost inevitable—are exactly the same reasons that are playing out in the Indo Pacific and which are driving Xi Jinping to want to conquer Taiwan in his lifetime. Both of these authoritarian leaders are in their early 70s, looking at the twilight of their careers, looking at their legacies, looking at their longevity and power and their own mortality. And when you look at Putin, what drove him, I believe, is a distorted view of history. He did not believe that Ukraine was a nation. He believed it belonged to Russia. He thought it was Russia's destiny and his personal destiny to bring it back, at least into Russia's sphere of influence, if not under full occupation. The same thing you're seeing in the Indo Pacific. Xi of course believes that Taiwan is not a state. It's also a destiny of the Chinese Communist Party to take Taiwan because of course it is unfinished business since the end of that civil war in 1949, when Mao defeated Chiang Kai Shek, but didn't fully defeat him, because he fled with 2 million nationals to Taiwan. So taking [Taiwan] has enormous symbolism for the Chinese Communist Party to really finish off that civil war and finally complete what Xi himself calls “a rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Spytalk: But all this has been the case for decades now. What’s bringing this to the crisis level now that you're suggesting it is?
Alperovitch: Well, in the case of both men, they're also driven by ego and they want to be the ones to do it. And it's not an accident that Putin invaded Ukraine when he did because he was looking at it again at the twilight of his career, 25 years in power, looking at how long he may stay in power, how long he may live and wanting to have that accomplishment in the history books, given to him and no one else. The same thing is how it's playing out in China. Xi is very explicit that this problem of Taiwan cannot be a transition to future generations. He says this on multiple occasions. Well, again, Xi is 70. In 2027, he is up for another election as the leader of the Communist Party, and he’s very likely to win that election for another five year term that will end in 2032, when he'll be 79. So I think in his mind, that window of likely 2028 to 2032 is going to be the opportunity for him to accomplish this long desired task…as the leader who will go into the history books, as the leader that is greater than Mao. So that is why I believe the next four to eight years are going to be very, very dangerous.
Spytalk: So as you point out in the book, in the past when American presidents were asked about the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, they have said that we would “help” Taiwan to defend herself. But President Biden has gone beyond that: When asked in 2022, whether the United States would defend Taiwan, he flatly said, “Yes, if in fact there was an unprecedented attack.” Are we committed to a full scale war with China in the event of an invasion of Taiwan?
Alperovitch: We do not have a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. We do not have the legal commitment. And every time Biden says something like this—and he’s done it now four times—the White House staff points out that the policy that we call strategic ambiguity—essentially, we are not acknowledging or denying that we will come to Taiwan’s defense—remains in place. But there's no question that the president is inherently changing that policy, if not officially, but certainly [it is being] transmitted to Beijing, transmitted to Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, that he wants to defend Taiwan.
This is a very, very tough call, even if Biden has that desire…at best a 50-50 decision. Because when you start looking at the impact of American [intervention], the loss of life you're going to have on the scale we haven't seen since World War Two, perhaps even eclipsing it —the destruction of the world economy—potentially as much as $10 trillion can be wiped out in the first year of a conflict.
This is really, really big stakes. Now I argue that the stakes for losing Taiwan are also enormous. …If China invades, whether it wins or loses, it will be just an absolute disaster for the world, for America, for Taiwan, for China itself. So we have to do whatever it takes to prevent that.
Spytalk: Can you explain that a little bit? I mean, clearly, if the Chinese were to take Taiwan, they would be the preeminent naval power in the South China Sea and in the eastern Pacific. But, Japan will still be there, South Korea will still be there. We will still have allies in the region. Why would it be the disaster for U.S. interests that you portray?
Alperovitch: Well, let me tell you the implications. And this is not a hypothetical. I've had senior officials in Japan and other countries in the region tell me what happens in their view if China takes Taiwan from their perspective: they will start acting as if they now have a new sheriff in town. America is kicked out of the region, America is irrelevant. And they have to accommodate them in a way that the Central Asian states, for example, have to kowtow to Russia, or the states in the Caucasus like Armenia have to be in Russia's sphere of influence. When Russia says jump, they really have to say how high and they don't have many other options. That is going to be Korea, that’s going to be Japan, that’s going to be the Philippines, not by choice but because they will have no other alternative. With the Chinese domination of that region. China will be able to set the rules of trade, the rules of security in that region. Again, 50% of the world's GDP is in that region. So by kicking America out, by dominating that region economically, and from a security order perspective, that will weaken American power. There will be a retrenchment of American power and a retrenchment of the American economy. That will be a weaker America and it will be a much more dangerous world.
Spytalk: So what do we do to prevent this?
Alperovitch: We have to make sure that Xi wakes up every single day, looks at himself in the mirror as he's shaving and says today is not the day. We have to create numerous dilemmas for him on the military front. We have to help the Taiwanese build up capabilities on that island to defend it. But we also have to do everything possible on the economic front, to make it clear to China that the consequences of a conflict over Taiwan regardless of whether we decide to come to Taiwan's aid, or not, are going to be devastating for their economy. I advocate a policy of uni-directional entanglement. In other words, making China more dependent on us in critical technologies like semiconductors, like artificial intelligence, biotech, and others, and making us less reliant on them so that they can’t punish our own economy in areas like critical minerals, which they dominate the processing of today, in areas like green energy, solar batteries or electric vehicles that they are establishing dominance now as well.
Spytalk – Does that include steps such as banning TikTok?
Alperovitch: Look, TikTok is not in my top 10 list of things we should do against China, but I'm certainly supportive of [banning] it. I think that TikTok is essentially a foreign media platform that is owned by a company that is operated and influenced massively by our adversary, the Chinese Communist Party. Half the American population using TikTok is a problem. We would never allow the main news channel of the Soviet Union to be broadcast as a major network in the United States, right? In fact, we do have laws on the books against that. You know, one of the most specific examples here is Rupert Murdoch, when he tried in the 1980s [to buy media properties in the United States]. He was prevented from doing so until he became an American citizen. So why would we let a foreign media company from an adversary country have that level of influence?
Spytalk: You are primarily known as a cyber security expert, who famously was part of the firm, CrowdStrike, that first uncovered the Russian hack of the Democratic National Committee in 2016. You write a lot about the enormous Chinese hacking capabilities and actions inside the United States. And this has been viewed for years as a threat that revolves around the giant theft of American intellectual property. That is bad enough. But there's a darker view of Chinese hacking, which suggests that they actually may be embedding themselves in our critical infrastructure to prepare for a future conflict with the United States. How do you parse out the goals of Chinese hacking operations— straight out intellectual property theft or perhaps the more sinister aim of embedding themselves in our infrastructure?
Alperovitch: That's a fascinating question, Michael. So as you know, the Chinese have had a cyber offensive program for well over two decades. In fact, going back to the early 2000s, much of it, as you rightly say, has been focused on theft on both traditional espionage of the type that we do—stealing government secrets, breaking into government networks—and a huge portion that has been based on stealing intellectual property from the private sector for the benefit of their own domestic industries, effectively waging economic warfare on this country that was largely unanswered until the Trump administration came along and instituted the so-called 301 tariffs in response to that intellectual property theft, raising tariffs in China.
Volt Typhoon, a Chinese hacking group, has been worming its way into utilities here and around U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region, which Alperovitch worries could immobilize them if war broke out.
However, in recent years, and the last couple of years specifically, you've had a shift where you have this group that is called Volt Typhoon, believed to be affiliated with the Chinese military, that is infiltrating networks that have no commercial benefit whatsoever—a small time water utility, a small electric utility, particularly organizations in the Indo-Pacific region, where we have U.S. military bases. There is nothing to steal there from an intellectual property perspective. But there is everything to gain from the ability to potentially attempt to disrupt operations in the event of conflict. And that worries the U.S. government greatly, that this is pre-positioning for potential disruption to try to delay our ability to flow forces to the Pacific, to defend Taiwan if it comes to that. And this is, you know, yet another sign that this is not just rhetoric that they're preparing for conflict.
Another amazing sign is some satellite photos that were released just in the last few weeks—open source satellite photos of the largest military training camp of the Chinese military in Inner Mongolia, where they built this interesting road network. If you overlay that road network on the city of Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, it is exactly the same down to every sort of turn of those roads. And in the center of that road network, sits the presidential palace of Taipei, right? So they're not just talking, they're preparing. They're exercising. And you know, when you think about it, why would you want to attack the presidential palace of Taipei? It's not a military target, it is the seat of the government of Taiwan. And the only reason that you would practice potential special forces raids on that presidential palace is because you want to orchestrate a coup. You want to take over that country.
Spytalk: As Xi looks at the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and all the problems Putin has had, how does he process that and what lessons do you believe he's taking from the Russian experience?
Alperovitch: It is fundamentally unknowable, because we're not in his head. I don't want to be in his head. He also doesn't strike me as a great learner to begin with, so I'm not sure that he's learning any lessons from it. But you could make the case on both sides that, you know, the case that some would make and do make, is that he looks at the quagmire that Putin has found himself in Ukraine, he looks at the economic impact of export controls and sanctions, some pressure on Western businesses to pull out of Russia, and he says, I don't want any of that.
But I can tell you that I had a conversation with a senior Pentagon official early on in the conflict, a couple of weeks into the war, and I asked that very question. How do you think China is looking at the situation? And his response was, I think they're learning that the United States will not fight a nuclear power. Right? So perhaps he's learning that the Americans are deterred, and they're seeing, of course, our debates about whether to provide Ukraine with aid, they're seeing as being very slow to provide them with long range weapons, and having restrictions on those weapons in terms of fighting Russia. And maybe they're saying, You know what, [the Americans] are gonna be scared, they're not going to interfere in defense of Taiwan. And if America is not defending, we can take Taiwan.
Spytalk: Just to wrap up on Russia and Ukraine. You write in the book that basically because American and NATO aid has helped the Ukrainians resist the Russians, that they've lost the war. Its military has been decimated, its stockpiles are depleted and it will take a decade or more to rebuild. But then you also say, despite all the lofty rhetoric in the west, the Ukrainian goal of regaining all of its territories might not be militarily achievable. If that's the case, are we looking at an endless war of attrition? And is there any strategy to change what seems to be the fait accompli on the battleground, which is the Russians have Crimea and Donbass? The Ukrainians have the West, and that's where this ends up?
Alperovitch: Well, I've argued for a long time that this war is not going to be endless. All wars ultimately do end. But it's going to continue on very likely for a long time. In some ways. It's already been going on for 10 years, since 2014. And, unfortunately, it can easily go on. And this is of course, devastating for Ukraine, first and foremost, but that is a reality—that as long as Russia can keep sending men and storm trooper battalions against fortifications and lose them at astounding rates, they’re gonna keep doing it until Putin or whoever replaces him one day decides to stop. But as I write in the book, as you point out, Russia has been defeated effectively as a force to threaten NATO. There's never been a moment in history, at least modern history, when NATO has been safer from Russia.
Spytalk: But a major part of the argument for continuing to send military aid to Ukraine is because if they prevail there, then Putin will be emboldened to then go after the Baltics or Poland or another NATO country. If, in fact, Russia is incapable of doing that, doesn't that take away one of the principal rationales behind continuing to fund the Ukrainian war effort?
Alperovitch: So I never believed in that rationale. He has made it very, very clear that he is fearful of escalation with NATO. He wants to avoid it at all costs because he knows he's weak. And he's of course much weaker now two and a half years almost into this war than he was at the beginning. Much of his army has been decimated. 25% of the Black Sea fleet has been destroyed by the Ukrainians, [and] that will take them decades to rebuild, if ever.. So NATO has never been safer. But I do think that there is a strong case to defend Ukraine and to help further weaken the Russian military as long as Ukrainians want to keep fighting. That is both moral and legal because Russia is trying to change borders in Europe for the first time since 1945. They must pay a price for it, a very hard price. So there are both legal, moral and strategic reasons to want to support Ukraine.
World on the Brink: How America Can Beat China in the Race for the Twenty-First Century, by Dmitri Alperovitch (with Garrett M. Graff) is available from booksellers everywhere. Washington, D.C.-area readers are encouraged to buy from the independent bookstore Politics and Prose.
Another excellent weekly. I see the pressures on XI a bit differently, I agree that he would like to take Taiwan by force if necessary. I also believe, however, that the understands that he will have to strike US forces in the region at the start of any conflict bringing Japan, and probably Australia in from day one. It will also likely tip the balance of opinion in Japan and South Korea to go nuclear a development that does not work in Beijing's favor. As stated the key is to keep Xi thinking that he could possibly loose such a war which means our emphasis should be on Taiwan's ability to kill Beijing's navy in the Strait.
I agree with Mr. Ford on this case....mostly. The pressure of history on Xi is as great as any other pressure. China's position has always been that Taiwan is a part of China and that there will be a reunification., preferably peacefully, by force if necessary. Time frame not stated, which gives wiggle room to Xi and those who follow him as China's leaders. Xi threatens and provokes. Do did Mao, starting back before Xi was born. But Mao chose patience over power. So did all of China's leaders since Mao. Why? No other choice, really, barring Taiwan's outright surrender Consider the enormity of such an invasion. The shortest distance between China and Taiwan is 81 miles, all over water, roughly four times the distance from England to Normandy. Rockets can travel at incredible speeds. Ships cannot. Preparations for an invasion would quickly become apparent. Chinese ships chugging toward Taiwan would be sitting ducks. Chinese losses would be enormous, possibly unsustainable. No one would win in the end.
Couldn't China simply nuke Taiwan into surrender? Sure. But, again, at what cost to China? And China would still have to occupy Taiwan, a wasteland.
Mr. Alperovitch and other like-minded pundits will continue to produce dire commentary, preach doom and gloom and otherwise predict war, not peace. Let's hope they are wrong. And let's hope that the more practical among us will point out what is and isn't practical and do all we can to balance the negativity that is thrust at us.